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DISCUSSION DRAFT
Prepared for the Greater Hartford Chamber of Connnerce's
Task Force on Tax-Exempt Property
March 2, 1978
Professor Richard D. Pomp
Service Charges on Tax-Exempt Institutions
A

The 1972 Governor's Commission on Tax Reform (the Baker Commission), as well
as other commentators, 1 has recommended that the tax-exempt institutions be
charged a fee for their consumption of municipal services. This proposal
attempts to strike a balance between the interests of the municipalities and
the interests of the tax-exempt institutions. On the one hand, the proposal
recognizes that the tax-exempts are consumers of locally provided, propertyrelated services, and thus ought to compensate the municipalities for the
costs of providing those services. On the other hand, by not subjecting the
tax-exempt institutions to the regular property tax, the proposal recognizes
the special status of these organizations.
A fee levied for the consumption of public services is known as a user, or
service, charge. User or service charges are hardly novel. A municipality
that bills property owners for their use of water already imposes a service
charge, and one that tax-exempt institutions currently pay. Advocates of the
service charge approach recommend that it be extended to all property-related
services , such as fire and police protection, refuse collection, sewer services,
street services , and the like.
Many economists are in favor of service charges for the same reasons that they
favor the use of prices in the private market: the minimization of waste by
consumers and the efficient allocation of resources.2 The provision of public
services differs from the provision of private services in one important respect, however. As a practical matter, it is difficult to measure the consumption of certain public services, such as fire or police protection, traffic
control, or road maintenance. Although the supplying of water and the collection of refuse may lend themselves easily to user charges, no administratively
feasible method exists for measuring the consumption of most other publicly
provided services. 3 A user charge based on each tax-exempt's actual consumption
of public services is therefore likely to be impractical.
alternative approach is to approximate a user charge by levying on taxexempts that percentage of the mill rate which is attributable to propertyrelated services . For example, if property-related services constitute one
third of all local governmental expenditures, then a tax-exempt institution
would pay a user charge equal to one third of the normal mill rate times its
assessed value . Using a percentage of the mill rate as a proxy for a user
charge is obviously a hybrid approach. Because no relationship exists between
a tax-exempt's consumption of services and the user charge, this approach will
be viewed by some less as a service charge and more as a thinly disguised
property tax.4
An

Whether viewed as a service charge or as a disguised property tax, this hybrid
approach may offset one of the inadvertent consequences of the existing system
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of tax exemptions for nonprofit organizations . Because these organizations do
not currently pay the property tax, economists argue that they are thereby
encouraged to overinvest in land and improvements and to hold land idle for
longer periods of time than would otherwise be true . These effects, if true,
are hard to justify in land-starved urban areas . Moreover, in times of unemployment any policy that encourages investment in land instead of in labor
is questionable. If a service charge reduces these effects, it will be serving
a positive goal.
B

In order to levy a service charge on the assessed value of a tax-exempt's land
and improvements, accurate data on fair market value is required. Connecticut,
unlike most other states, requires municipal ities to assess their tax-exempt
property periodically, but these assessments are presumed by most persons to
be less accurate than assessments of taxable properties. This presumption is
entirely reasonable: because exempt properties are not taxed, accuracy in
their assessment is not crucial, and little effort is therefore spent in
valuing them. Yet, even if considerable time and effort were devoted to the
assessment process, valuation problems would still exist since many exempt
structures are unique or are rarely sold .
At the heart of the valuation problem is whether the traditional techniques
for determining fair market value work satisfactorily when applied to taxexempt property. In general, three traditional approaches are used in determining the value of property: the market, the income, and the cost approaches . 5
Under the market approach, the value of a property is determined by examining
the sales prices of similar properties that have been sold recently in the
same geographical area . This method is typical] y used in the valuation of
residential property, because a sufficient number of similar properties are
available for comparison. Tax-exempts are not often sold, however, and the
market approach is therefore unlikely to prove satisfactory in many cases .
Moreover, the uniqueness of many tax-exempts makes the comparison of sales
data, even if available, of J ittle value.
Under the income approach, the appraiser estimates the annual income derived
from the operation of a building, obtains net income by subtracting operating
costs, and capitalizes net income to arrive at fair market value. The income
approach would be satisfactory for valuing an apartment building owned by a
hospital and rented to its staff, or for valuing university-owned dormitories
or faculty housing. Most tax-exempt property does not produce income, however, and the income approach would not be generally applicable.
Under the cost approach, an estimate is first made of the current costs of
reproducing the structure being valued. This estimate is then adjusted for
depreciation and obsolescence. Although the application of the cost approach
to commercial and industrial property is well-developed, little experience
exists in applying the method to unique structures, such as the Capitol or
churches . The cost approach could, conceivably, be modified for use even with
these types of structures.
The application of any one of these three valuation techniques to tax-exempt
property is not likely to be completely satisfactory, though some situations
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will be amenable to standard techniques. For example, if a tax-exempt institution buys property that was previously taxable, an assessment for the purchased
property will have already been established . In addition, any recent construction by a tax-exempt can be satisfactorily valued under the cost approach .
Also, situations in which the tax-exempt structure is similar in function and
design to a taxable structure, such as an office building that serves as the
headquarters of a tax-exempt institution, should not pose a severe valuation
problem. Finally, it should be realized that taxable properties can also
present problems of "uniqueness II which assessors have had to cope with for a
long time. Nonetheless, an area requiring further research is whether the
valuation of tax-exempt properties is a manageable problem.7
C

What effect will a service charge have on the operations of a tax-exempt
institution? An institution's response in the face of the increased cost may
be to (1) lower the price, quality, or quantity of the goods and services that
it purchases; (2) raise the price that it charges for its services; (3) increase
its efforts to solicit funds; (4) draw upon any liquid assets, such as an
endowment; (5) alter the amount of property it owns; or (6) reduce or el iminate its operations.8
Not all of these alternatives may be available to every institution. Because
of the he terogeneity of tax-exempts as a group, predicting how these institutions will respond to a service charge is not possible. The magnitude of the
service charge, the cost and revenue structure of the institution, its ability
to pass the charge forward or backward, and its ability to offset the charge
by soliciting more donations are among the factors that influence an institution's response.9 It should not be assumed, however, that any increase in the
price of an institution's services or that any curtailment in its services
will necessarily be undesirable. For example , if the service charge causes a
hospital to increase the rents paid by doctors for the use of hospitals upplied housing or offices, the actual result may be a progressive redistribution of a municipality's tax burden. At a minimum, however, a service
charge will inevitably produce a financial strain for certain institutions.
The service charge approach therefore presents the problem of identifying
those institutions which merit special re]ief from ~he increased cost.
One way of responding to this problems is through the use of a "c ircu it breaker."
In its simplest form, a circuit breaker would provide that the user charge
could never exceed a certain percentage o[ the institution' s net income,
defined as gross receipts (including contributions and other voluntary payments),
less operating expenses . A circuit breaker developed for small institutions
relying primarily on volunteer help and contributions might be inappropriate,
however , for a large institution with an endowment f und, such as a hospital or
a university . Different circuit breakers may have to be developed to take
into account the net worth of different institutions, the source of their
funds, the identity of their beneficiaries, and so forth.
Service Charges--Sunnnary of Issues
I.

How many services can be adequately "priced" under a pure user charge
approach? Probably, no feasible way exists to "pr ice" most property-
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related services.
II.

In order to avoid the problem of pr1c1ng each property-related service,
an alternative approach is to calculate the percentage of the municipal
budget which is attributed to such a service. This percentage of the mil]
rate can then be applied to the assessed value of each tax-exempt institution.
A.

Advantages
J.
2.

B.

Generates revenue for the municipality.
Offsets the present bias for tax-exempts to overinvest in land
and to hold land idle.

Problem Areas
1.

Requires the valuation of each tax-exempt institution.
feasible?
a.
b.

Is this

Assessments for tax-exempts already exist, but are they
satisfactory?
Land, recent improvements, and previously taxed property
acquired by a tax-exempt may not pose significant valuation problems; but churches, historic buildings, and other
"unique" structures may require that difficuJ t, subjective
judgments be made.

2.

What effect will the user charge have on the operations of the
tax-exempt institutions?

3.

Is there a ny feasible way of identifying those institutions
which do not have the ability to pay the service charge? Is
the use of a circuit breaker or similar approach feasible?
State Payments to Municipalities
A

Connecticut currently has a PILOT program (payment in lieu of truces) under
which the state makes payments to municipalities to partially offset the taxes
they lose through the presence of state-owned property. The PILOT program
recognizes the unfairness of forcing certain municipalities to subsidize state
government. This program could be extended to include private, tax-exempt
institutions and thereby relieve the burden on those municipalities which
subsidize another state objective--the encouragement of nonprofit activities.
A PILOT program that covered these institutions would recognize that their
benefits are regional and statewide and that their costs should not be borne
primarily by their host jurisdictions. Compared with a service charge, a
PILOT program has the advantage of not infringing upon the operations of the
tax-exempt institutions; for this reason, it is a politically attractive
approach.
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A PILOT program that reimbursed municipalities for the property tax lost
because of the presence of private, nonprofit organizations would raise all of
the valuation difficulties previously discussed, but with one additional and
significant difference. In the case of a user charge, the tax-exempts and the
municipalities stand in adversary positions vis-a-vis the assessed value of
the property. A check is thus provided on the valuation process . But, under
a PILOT program, the municipality has everything to gain by overvaluing the
property, since the higher the value of the tax-exempt property, the more the
municipality would receive from the state. Given that normal assessment
techniques may not be suitable for the valuation of tax-exempt property, the
state would find it difficult to police the figures supplied by the municipalities.11 A PILOT program thus places the state in the position of making
payments on the basis of controversial assessments that can be easily manipulated by the municipalities.
One way of mitigating this prob]em is to eliminate the hard-to-value properti es
from the PILOT program. For example, payments could be made on the basis of
the fair market value of only the land owned by the tax-exempts, on the theory
(which may not prove to be true in all cases) that the land is easier and less
controversial to value than a tax-exempt's improvements. In addition, payments
could be made for taxable property that had been recently acquired by a taxexempt, because an accurate valuation of such property would already exis t.
Similarly, PILOT payments could be made for any recent improvement s, since the
cost of such improvements would be an accurate measure of their fair market
value. Finally, PILOT payments could be based on the existing assessments of
tax-exempt property, 12 which the municipalities are required to make under
state law. Unless all future payments were based on existing assessments
(which could be adjusted for inflation), however, the valuation problem would
still arise at some point in the future.13
The valuation problem could be avoided by adopting a relatively simple and
objective formula as the basis for PILOT payments--a formula based on square
footage. The square footage formula would express the relationship between
the cost of municipal services and the square feet of land and improvements in
the municipality. By dividing the property tax revenue by the square feet of
land and improvements, a mill rate per square foot could be derived. This
figure would then be multiplied by the amount of square feet that any taxexempt property occupies in order to obtain the PILOT payment. Admittedly,
such a formula is arbitrary to the extent that municipal costs are not directly related to square footage. Although this criticism may prevent the
formula from serving as the basis of a service charge, which would be paid by
the institution itself, the formula is certainly workable as the foundation
for a PILOT program. In reality, the formula may not be any more arbitrary as
a basis for PILOT payments than are subjective and elusive valuations of taxexempt property.14
B

The final question concerns the distribution of PILOT funds. Under either a
square footage formula or an assessed valuation approach, aid can be channeled
only to those jurisdictions which have a disproportionate amount of tax-exempt
property. One alternative is to make payments only to municipalities whose
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tax-exempt property (whether measured by square footage or market value)
exceeds the statewide average. The PILOT payment could then be a function of
the difference between the statewide average and the municipality's figure.
Another alternative would be to make payments only to municipalities whose
tax-exempt property exceeds a certain percentage of their taxable grand list.
Numerous variations of these alternatives are possible, of course.
Drawing a distinction among jurisdictions on the basis of their amount of taxexempt property would separate suburban and rural areas from urban areas.
This distinction can be defended by focusing on the types of tax-exempt institutions likely to be found in these different areas. In suburban and rural
areas, the tax-exempt institutions typically serve a local constituency;
institutions located in the city, however, more commonly serve a regional and,
in some cases, a statewide constituency . State PILOT payments to jurisdictions
having a greater than average amount of tax-exempt property would reflect the
spillover in benefits. The cost of the PILOT program would therefore be
shared, to some degree, by those who enjoy the services of the institutions.
State Payments to Municipalities--Summary of Issues
I.

Advantages
A.
B.

II.

Does not interfere with the operations of the tax-exempts.
Distributes the costs of the exemption among residents of the state.

Problem Areas
A.

Requires the valuation of the tax-exempts. Is this feasible ?
Valuation of the institutions raises the same issues as a user
charge, with one additional and significant problem. Under a PILOT
program, the tax-exempts have no incentive to contest their assessments. Therefore, no check exists on a municipality's incentive to
overassess the tax-exempts in order to obtain larger PILOT payments .
Can the state police this problem?
1.

Can the valuation morass be avoided by using a square footage
formula, or a similar approach?

III. Which Municipalities Will Receive PILOT Payments?
A.
B.
C.

All municipalities?
Only jurisdictions having an amount of tax-exempt property in excess
of the statewide average?
Only jurisdictions having an amount of tax-exempt property in excess
of a certain percentage of their taxable grand list?

Acreage, Market Value, and Other Limitations on the Exemption
Other means of balancing the interests of the tax-exempts with the interests
of the municipalities involve the imposition of various ceiling or similar
limitations on the exemption . For example, a time period could be provided
beyond which the exemption would be phased out. The exemption might be
granted for the first five years in an organization's life and phased out
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thereafter. A time limitation would enable new organizations to get started
without the burden of the property tax and, at the same time, would recognize
the host jurisdiction ' s interest in not being burdened with a perpetual exemption. If the time period is sufficient , the organization wiJ 1 be able to
plan for the eventual phasing out of the exemption. Other approaches would be
to limit the number of acres of land which could qualify for the exemption, to
place a ceiling on the fair market value of property that can be exempt, or to
phase in the exemption whenever taxable property is removed from the grand
list by a tax-exempt. As is true with respect to any approach that imposes
increased costs on the tax-exempts, relief may have to be provided for those
institutions which are unable to bear the additional financial burden imposed
by a curtailment of the exemption.
Research is underway to determine the extent to which these J imi ts are used by
other states . Preliminary findings indicate that ceilings on acreage and fair
market value are used by some states in limited circumstances.
Municipal Permission for Tax-Exempts To Acquire Taxable Property
Another approach would be to require a municipality's permission before any
taxable property could be acquired for a tax-exempt purpose. The municipality
would thus be given the power to control the erosion of its tax base, a power
similar to the power that it now possesses to grant property tax exemptions in
order to attract new industrial and conunercial property.
Although our research has not yet uncovered any state that has granted this
authority to its municipalities, three sets of potential problems can be
identified which need further study . First, from the state's perspective, the
cities represent the optimum location for many kinds of tax-exempts. The
cities are the administrative, cultural, medical, and educational centers for
both their surrounding regions and the state. Services offered by nonprofit
institutions located in urban areas are accessible to the greatest number of
persons. The state ' s interest in having an optimum distribution of these
services thus conflicts with a municipality's interest in restricting the
expansion of the tax-exempts . Limiting a municipality's power to deny the
expansion of a tax-exempt may therefore be necessary in order to ensure that
the state's interests are not significantly undermined. Second, controls may
be required so that a tax-exempt does not simply play one jurisdiction off
against another in an attempt to nullify each municipa]ity's power. Third,
the state would have to provide certain guidelines for the exercise of the
municipality's power if it is to guarantee that all organizations are treated
fairly and equally.
Review of the Statutory Definition of Tax-Exempt Property
No significant legislative changes have recently been made in the state's
definition of those activities which qualify for the tax exemption. The
rec~urse of the towns has been to institute litigation, and the task of refining the definition and of resolving the inevitable ambiguities in the law
has therefore fallen onto the courts. The legislature appears indifferent
whether the law developed by the courts comports with current views on the
policy underlying the granting of the exemption .
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Perhaps the source of the state's indifference can be identified. Under the
present system, the municipalities--not the state-- bear the cost of the
exemption; consequently, the state has little direct financial interest in
maintaining close vigilance over the deve]opment of the law. A PILOT program
for tax-exempts would provide an incentive for the state to examine the
present range of uses and activities that qualify for the exemption. Whether
or not a PILOT program is adopted, however, an evaluation of existing law is
appropriate. Research is currently being conducted to determine the scope of
existing tax exemptions. This research will also examine the definition of
tax-exempt activities which is used for federal income tax purposes to see
whether some correlation between the state and the federal definitions is
possible. 15
The Church/State Issue
In contrast to all the other tax-exempt institutions covered by this discussion
draft, churches pose a special set of constitutional problems. The first
amendment prohibits laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." In a sense, the first amendment acts as a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, any state policy that benefits religion
is likely to be challenged by opponents as an impermissible establishment of
religion. On the other hand, those who support the policy are likely to argue
that a failure to provide the benefit places an unconstitutional burden on the
free exercise of religion. The "damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you- don't" natur e
of the dilemma is readily apparent.
Research is needed to evaluate the constitutional issues presented by the
following questions:
1.

Could the state make PILOT payments to municipalities which are
based on either the value or the square footage of church property?
Conversely, could church property be excluded from a PILOT program?

2.

Could a service charge based on that percentage of the mill rate
which represents property-related services be applied t o churches?
Conversely, could churches be exempted from a service charge that is
applied to all other tax-exempts?

3.

Could a law under which a municipality's permission were r equired
before a tax-exempt institution could expand its land holdings be
applied to churches? Conversely, could churches be exempt f r om
requiring the municipality ' s permission?

4.

Could various limits on the property tax exemption (for example,
the first 50 acres of land or the first $100,000 of value) be
applied to churches? Conversely, could churches be exempt from such
limits if they were applied to all other tax-exempts?

* *

*
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FOOTNOTES
lsee, e.g . , Quigley and Schmenner, Property Tax Exemption and Public
Policy, 23 Public Policy 259, 278 (1975).
2see, e.g . , Kafoglis, "Local Service Charges: Theory and Practice, "
in Johnson (ed . ), State and Local Tax Problems (Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1969~Netzer,User Charge Revenue in Connecticut:
Practice and Prospects (Connecticut State Revenue Task Force, 1970).
3Even if it were possible to develop a pricing mechanism for a wider
range of municipal services, other difficulties remain. Requiring
payment for services that are meant to be redistributive in nature
(e.g., welfare) is obviously counter-productive. Furthermore, there
are many services, such as education, which are purposely made available to all consumers regardless of their ability to pay. Also, the
Internal Revenue Code does not allow a deduction for service charges
(unless business related) but does allow a deduction for property
taxes . The federal income tax thus contains an inducement for municipalities to "bill" for services through the property tax, rather
than utilizing service charges.
4 If this approach is viewed as a service charge, will an adjustment be
made for tax-exempts that have their own private security guards or
who pay for the private collection of refuse? If viewed as a property
tax, will this approach violate the property tax immunity found in the
charter of a number of private colleges and universities (e . g., Yale,
Trinity, and Wesleyan)?
Not only is there no precise way to link an institution's consumption
of services with the amount called a service c harge, but there is the
additional problem that so-called property-related services also
benefit individuals qua individuals rather than qua property owners .
For example, police services protect individuals as well as their real
and personal property. No method exists for separating the total
amount spent on police protection into these components . Classifying
all of the cos ts for police protection as a property-related service
is thus an oversimplification.
5 see G. Wassall, Tax-Exempt Property:
Lincoln Institute, 1974).

A Case Study 44 (John C.

6Assessment Valuation Manual, Volume 4 (Ontario Ministry of Revenue,
1972) .
7For example, could the amount of fire insurance coverage carried by
the institution provide an acceptable figure for valuation purposes?

8G. Wassall, Tax-Exempt Property: A Case Study of Hartford,
Connecticut 53 (John C. Lincoln Institute, 1974).
9The problem of adjusting to a service charge would be l ess severe if

the charge were phased in over a period of years.
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lOFederal PILOT programs also exist with respect to properties owned
by the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Farmers Horne Administration, and some forest lands.
llquery whether the amount of fire insurance coverage carried by the
institution could provide an acceptable figure that would help reduce
disagreement over valuation.
12These valuations may aJready be overinflated, however, by a mun1c1pality wishing to dramatize the erosion of its grand list by taxexempts, or by a municipality having the foresight to anticipate the
eventual enactment of a PILOT program.
lJTo the extent the PILOT payinents arc based on only a small percentage
o( the value of the municipality ' s tax-exempt property, or limited in
total amount by a low cap, the valuation problem becomes less significant.
14The square footage formuJa can also be refined to adapt to special
categories of property. Take the case of undeveloped land. Because
undeveloped land arguably consumes fewer municipal services than
improved land, it may be viewed as unfair to divide the total property
tax levy by a square footage figure that includes raw land. Instead,
some percentage of the property tax levy, perhaps measured only by
property related services (similar to the service charge approach) can
be used. A levy per square foot of undeveloped land could thus be
derived which would then be used as the basis of the PILOT payment.
This same approach could be extended to other categories of property.
lSEven if the definitions were to remain unrelated, some coordination
between the IRS and the state is still possible . For example, the IRS
could notify the state whenever the federal tax-exempt status of a
Connecticut organization has been either revoked or denied.
It would
seem appropriate that a federal denial or revocation of tax-exempt
status should trigger a re-examination of the organization ' s property
tax exemption.
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